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LINCOLN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION, 
AND EXECUTIVE POWER 
HENRY L. CHAMBERS, JR.• 
INTRODUCTION 
One hundred and fifty years after President Abraham Lincoln 
signed the Emancipation Proclamation, the debate regarding the 
President's constitutional authority to issue the Proclamation is no 
less interesting than it was when the Proclamation was first read. 1 
Though the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment substantially 
mooted the need to determine the Proclamation's constitutionality, 
thorny questions remain regarding President Lincoln's executive au-
thority to issue the Proclamation.2 Often, the debate focuses on the 
President's commander-in-chief power; however, a relatively broad vi-
sion of this power effectively ends the discussion. 3 In the context of 
the Civil War, the commander-in-chief power focuses on the Presi-
dent's power to act extraordinarily in extraordinary circumstances. 4 
The constitutional question becomes whether the commander-in-
Copyright © 2013 by Henry L. Chambers,Jr. 
'Professor of Law, University of Richmond. The author wishes to thank those who 
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1. The constitutionality of the Emancipation Proclamation remains subject to de-
bate. See Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the Emancipation Proc-
lamation Constitutional: Do We/Should We Care What the Answer ls?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135, 
1148-49 (2001 ) (noting three options regarding the constitutionality of the Emancipation 
Proclamation: it was constitutional because its scope was limited; it was constitutional be-
cause Lincoln had nearly unlimited power to issue it; or it was unconstitutional). 
2. By outlawing slavery in the United States, the Thirteenth Amendment rendered 
the constitutionality of the Emancipation Proclamation largely academic. U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIII; see also Paul Finkelman, Lincoln, Emancipation, and the Limits of Constitutional 
Change, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 349, 349 (noting that the Civil War and Thirteenth Amend-
ment eclipsed any legal significance the Emancipation Proclamation might have had in 
1863). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States . . . . ") . See John Yoo, Review, Unitary, Executive, or Both?, 76 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1935, 2005-06 (2009) (discussing arguments supporting and criticizing 
President Lincoln 's use of his commander-in-chief power) . 
4. See id. at 2006 (discussing President Lincoln 's broad use of his commander-in-chief 
power to "respond[] to a crisis that threatened the very life of the nation"). 
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chief power allowed President Lincoln to act outside of the Constitu-
tion's structure of separation of powers and checks and balances dur-
ing the Civil War. 5 The issue of the Emancipation Proclamation's 
constitutionality can then be narrowed further, to whether the Proc-
lamation was calculated to help the Union win the Civil War. Not only 
was the Emancipation Proclamation calculated to help the war effort, 
it did. 6 
Rather than consider President Lincoln's power to issue the 
Emancipation Proclamation as Commander in Chief, this Essay focus-
es on a different segment of the President's executive authority: the 
Take Care Clause. 7 Specifically, it considers whether President Lin-
coln was authorized to issue the Emancipation Proclamation based on 
his responsibility to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."8 If 
President Lincoln's take care duty authorized him to issue the Eman-
cipation Proclamation, the Proclamation can be seen as a historic and 
momentous document issued consistent with the Executive's normal 
constitutional power, rather than one that was justified only by the 
enormous power claimed by President Lincoln as Commander in 
Chief in the con text of the Civil War. 9 
The suggestion that the Emancipation Proclamation may have 
been defensible as a standard executive order runs contrary to some 
accepted constitutional and historical wisdom. 10 Indeed, the Emanci-
5. See id. at 2005 (noting claims that Lincoln's exercise of executive power, including 
the commander-in-chief power, was outside of constitutional limits). Indeed, the com-
mander-in-chief power can crowd out legislative power, though Congress attempted to 
keep a &and in war policy during the Civil War. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE 
EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 18 (1963) ("Congress was determined to take steps to 
demonstrate its authority in the conflict in other ways.") . 
6. The Emancipation Proclamation helped the Union sustain itself domestically and 
internationally. See Jason A. Adkins, Lincoln's Constitution Reuisited, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 211, 
247 (2009) ("Lincoln believed that slave emancipation was a necessary military measure to 
deprive the South of both resources and troops."); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, MR. LINCOLN & 
THE NEGROES 54 (1963) ("He issued the Proclamation as Commander in Chief of the Ar-
my and Navy in an effort to weaken the enemy. The Commander in Chief could blockade 
the ports of the enemy to keep supplies from reaching him. By the same reasoning, he 
was entitled to weaken the South by freeing its slaves and robbing it of manpower."); see 
also DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 153 (2003) (noting the argument that 
emancipation might help keep European countries neutral, thereby helping the Union 
cause). 
7. U.S. CONST. art. II§ 3. 
8. Id. 
9. See infra Part Ill. 
10. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 685 (1952) 
(Vinson, CJ., dissenting) (''The most striking action of President Lincoln was the Emanci-
pation Proclamation, issued in aid of the successful prosecution of the War Between the 
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pation Proclamation is considered by some to be a great American 
document precisely because it required that President Lincoln act 
boldly and courageously, and possibly outside of his constitutional 
comfort zone. 11 That vision of the Emancipation Proclamation, how-
ever, essentially ignores legislation regarding slaves and slavery that 
Congress passed between the start of the Civil War and the issuance of 
the Emancipation Proclamation. 12 During that time, in each law that 
addressed slaves and slavery, Congress moved toward freeing slaves 
and limiting slavery. 13 Congress also indicated a willingness to eman-
cipate various groups of slaves as war policy. 14 Indeed, those laws gave 
the President the power and duty to seize and liberate the property, 
including slaves, of those who were engaged in war against the United 
States or were disloyal to the United States. 15 President Lincoln issued 
the Emancipation Proclamation against that legislative backdrop. 
Given such legislation, President Lincoln may have had the constitu-
tional authority to issue much of the Emancipation Proclamation un-
der his take care authority. 16 
This Essay explores whether President Lincoln's Emancipation 
Proclamation, freeing all slaves held in areas designated by the Presi-
dent to be under rebellion onJanuary 1, 1863, could be justified as an 
States, but wholly without statutory authority."); Levinson, supra note 1, at 1144-45 (dis-
cussing Supreme Court Justice Curtis's pamphlet entitled "Executive Power," which argued 
that the Emancipation Proclamation was unconstitutional). 
11. See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 350 (noting Lincoln's concerns over the constitu-
tionality of the Emancipation Proclamation); ALBERT A. WOLDMAN, LAWYER LINCOLN 333 
(1936) (noting Lincoln's cautious approach to the constitutionality of emancipation). 
The document may have been dry and legalistic as a result. See Levinson, supra note 1, at 
1140 (suggesting that the limited reach of the Emancipation Proclamation could be due to 
Lincoln's desire to stay loyal to the Constitution); Yoo, supra note 3, at 2013 ("Lincoln's 
dependence on his constitutional autl10rity explains the Emancipation Proclamation's 
careful boundaries."). 
12. See infra Part I. Some historians have argued that the Emancipation Proclamation 
had very little practical effect. See, e.g., Robert Fabrikant, Emancipation and the Proclamation: 
Of Contrabands, Congress, and Lincoln, 49 How. LJ. 313, 314 (2006) ("As a legal matter, the 
Proclamation had little, if any, emancipatory value, and to the extent it had legal vitality, it 
was largely redundant with legislation already passed by the Civil War Congress."). 
13. See infra Parts l.A-C. 
14. See, e.g., Fabrikant, supra note 12, at 327 ("The [First Confiscation Act] raised the 
specter that the federal government would destroy slavery as a means of winning the 
War."). Of course, Congress has the latitude to set war policy in a number of ways. See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing Congress the responsibilities to declare war, raise an ar-
my and navy, and make rules and regulations for the armed forces); Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 643-44 (Jackson, J. concurring) (discussing Congress 's broad consti-
tutional authority to set war policy) . 
15. See infra Parts I.A-C. 
16. See infra Part III.B. 
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exercise of his power under the Take Care Clause. Part I of this Essay 
discusses the legislation that preceded the Emancipation Proclama-
tion. Part II discusses the Emancipation Proclamation. Part III dis-
cusses the Take Care Clause and how it might authorize significant 
parts of the Emancipation Proclamation, if not the entire document. 
I. PRE-EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION CIVIL WAR LEGISLATION 
In the antebellum era, Congress adamantly refused to legislate 
regarding slavery in the states. 17 The issue was deemed a state prerog-
ative on which Congress had little or no constitutional authority. 18 
The Civil War, however, triggered wartime legislation that directly and 
indirectly affected slaves and slavery. 19 The slavery-related legislation 
passed between the advent of the Civil War and the Emancipation 
Proclamation's issuance was wide-ranging. 20 Some legislation focused 
on ensuring that slaves were not used against the Union. 21 Some legis-
lation directed the emancipation of slaves who directly supported or 
fought for the Union cause. 22 Some legislation outlawed slavery in 
certain parts of the Union. 23 Though specific laws may have applied 
to a discrete group of slaves or a particular swath of the United States, 
when taken as a whole, Civil War legislation passed before the Eman-
cipation Proclamation was issued makes clear that Congress was will-
17. Indeed, for a time, Congress refused to discuss slavery. See Michael Kent Curtis, 
The Curious Histary of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 
NW. U. L. REV. 785, 848-49 (1995) (discussing the antebellum "gag rule" that effectively 
barred discussion of slavery petitions in the House of Representatives). 
18. See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 352-54 (noting the accepted limitations during the 
Civil War era on how the federal government could address slavery in the states) ;JAMES G. 
RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 350-51 (1951) (noting that Lin-
coln maintained "that Congress had no constitutional power to overthrow slavery in the 
States"); Sandra L. Rierson, The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolution, 35 VT. L. 
REV. 765, 836 (2011) (noting that even radical abolitionists did not argue that the federal 
government could outlaw slavery in the states). 
19. See infra Parts l.A-C; see also RANDALL, supra note 18, at 343 ("When the Civil War 
came, however, it was widely believed that the Government acquired a power in this field 
which in peace times it did not have."). 
20. See HE RY W. WILBUR, PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS SLAVERY AND 
EMANCIPATION 54-59 (1970) (discussing the variety of legislation passed between the ad-
vent of the Civil War and the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation); see generally 
HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE ANTISLAVERY MEAsURES OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH AND 
THIRTY-EIGHTH UNITED STATES CONGRESSES, 1861-64 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1864) 
(discussing antislavery legislation) . 
21. See infra Part I.A. 
22 . See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
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ing to move toward emancipation as a war measure, and more gener-
ally. 24 
A. The First Confiscation Act 
Passed soon after the First Battle of Bull Run, the First Confisca-
tion Act was signed by President Lincoln on August 6, 1861. 25 The Act 
provided that property, including slaves, used to support "the present 
or any future insurrection against the Government of the United 
States" would be "lawful subject of prize and capture." 26 The Act had 
a context. In May 1861, soon after the beginning of the Civil War, 
General Benjamin Butler was faced with deciding what to do with 
runaway slaves who had appeared at Fortress Monroe, where Butler 
was in command. 27 After learning that the slaves had been used in 
service of the Confederacy-building encampments and providing 
other valuable labor to the rebel cause-Butler declined to return the 
slaves to Major M.B. Carey, the emissary who the slaves' owner, Colo-
24. This is in marked opposition to the final efforts to avoid disunion just before the 
Civil War began. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puz.zle of Constitu-
tional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 732 n.261 (2011) ("In 1861, in a last-ditch at-
tempt to prevent more Southern states from seceding, Congress proposed, President Lin-
coln endorsed, and three states ratified a constitutional amendment (known as the Corwin 
amendment) that made explicit Congress's lack of power to interfere with or abolish slav-
ery in any state, and that prohibited any subsequent constitutional amendment to the con-
trary."); Rierson, supra note 18, at 847 ("The efforts of the President and of Congress to 
entice the southern states back into the Union with promises of non-interference with 
slavery obviously failed. As the prospect of secession and civil war became a stark reality, 
the President and his party began to gradually move towards the abolition of slavery."); 
WILBUR, supra note 20, at 44-46 (discussing Congress's various attempts to placate the 
South and avert war beginning in December 1860). Indeed, Lincoln personally attempted 
to avoid disunion. See WOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 287-88 (noting that Lincoln's First In-
augural Address struck a conciliatory note with the South regarding slavery). 
25. An Act to confiscate Property used for Insurrectionary Purposes, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 
319 (1861) [hereinafter First Confiscation Act]. Both the Union and the Confederacy 
passed confiscation acts in the first year of the Civil War. See BURRUS M. CARNAHAN, ACT 
OF JUSTICE: LINCOLN'S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AND THE LAW OF WAR 90-92 (2007) 
(discussing Confederate confiscation acts); RANDALL, supra note 18, at 275-76 (discussing 
Confederate confiscation acts passed before and after the First Confiscation Act). 
26. First Confiscation Act, supra note 25, § 1. Congress clearly had the power to pass 
such legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing Congress power to "make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water"). 
27. CARNAHAN, supra note 25, at 84. Butler had addressed issues surrounding the 
runaway slave issue during his service in Maryland. Butler, a lawyer, had argued that slave-
owners in Maryland should have their rights to slaves protected because Maryland had re-
mained in the Union. Lours s. GERTEIS, FROM CONTRABAND TO FREEDMAN 12-13 (1973); 
MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND 
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 24 (2001) (noting that General Butler had "offered to put 
down a rumored slave rebellion in Maryland") . 
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nel Charles Mallory, had sent to retrieve them. 28 Butler had offered 
to return the slaves if Mallory would appear at Fortress Monroe and 
pledge loyalty to the Union. 29 Mallory never appeared; Butler de-
clared the slaves to be contraband of war and declined to return 
them. 30 Rather than allow those slaves to rejoin their Confederate 
master, Butler decided to use them for the Union cause. 3 1 Eventually, 
Secretary of War Simon Cameron made Butler's policy official War 
Department policy. 32 Butler's approach was incorporated into the 
First Confiscation Act. 33 
28. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 364; GERTEIS, supra note 27, at 13. 
29. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 365. 
30. Id.; GERTEIS, supra note 27, at 13 ("Butler now argued that since Rebels in the 
Hampton area were using blacks to erect fortifications in support of the rebellion, the 
slave property in his possession was contraband, liable to confiscation by the laws of war.") . 
31. See CARNAHAN, supra note 25, at 84; Finkelman, supra note 2, at 365 ("Taking 
slaves away from Mallory and other Confederates served the dual purposes of depriving 
the enemy of labor while providing labor for the United States."). A number of Union 
generals grappled with how to address the issue of slavery. In late 1861 , General John C. 
Fremont, military commander in Missouri, declared martial law in Missouri and deemed 
free all rebel-owned slaves in the state. See MICHAEL BURLINGAME, LINCOLN AND THE CIVIL 
WAR 53 (2011) (discussing General Fremont's emancipation order in Missouri); 
VORENBERG, supra note 27, at 25 (2001) (noting General Fremont's emancipation of slaves, 
subsequently revoked by Lincoln). Similarly, in early 1862, General David Hunter, com-
mander of U.S. forces in the Department of the South, declared martial law in Georgia, 
Florida, and South Carolina and deemed all slaves in such states to be free. See Finkelman, 
supra note 2, at 375-76 (discussing General Hunter's emancipation order); RANDALL, su-
pra note 18, at 354 (discussing General Fremont's general order on emancipation of slaves 
and General Hunter's similar order); VORENBERG, supra note 27, at 25-26 (noting General 
Hunter's emancipation of slaves in the Deep South, subsequently revoked by Lincoln). 
President Lincoln countermanded both generals. See BURLINGAME, supra, at 54 (noting 
that Lincoln distinguished between commandeering, which military officials can do, and 
confiscation, which only political branches can order); DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at 46 (not-
ing Lincoln's assertion that military officials may have the right to commandeer property 
for a short amount of time, but had no right to confiscate permanently); Finkelman, supra 
note 2, at 377 (noting Lincoln's claim that he, as Commander in Chief, was the only au-
thority that could order emancipation for military necessity); WILBUR, supra note 20, at 61-
63 (discussing General Fremont and Hunter's emancipation orders and Lincoln's coun-
termand of them). 
32. See CARNAHAN, supra note 25, at 85-86. Indeed, by August 1861, Butler's policy 
appeared to have been normalized. See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 366 ("The U.S. Army 
could employ any slaves who ran to its lines, provided they came from Confederate states. 
This was not a general emancipation policy, and, indeed, the army was not supposed to 
deliberately attempt to free slaves. But the army would not return fugitive slaves to masters 
in the Confederate states, even if the masters claimed to be loyal to the United States."); 
WILBUR, supra note 20, at 60-61 (noting that Secretary of War Cameron made General 
Butler's refusal to return fugitive slaves War Department policy, but directed that the labor 
of slaves used be recorded). Indeed, Secretary of War Simon Cameron attempted to go 
farther. See BURLINGAME, supra note 31, at 60 (noting that Secretary of War Cameron had 
advocated emancipation and arming slaves in his 1861 annual report and was subsequently 
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The First Confiscation Act required the forfeiture of property 
used directly against the United States during the war. 34 The forfei-
ture was not punishment; it was based on the misuse of the property. 
The property was not merely commandeered; the property rights in 
the forfeited property were to be transferred to the United States. 35 
The Act stated that seized property would be condemned in the ap-
propriate federal district court and sold for the benefit of the United 
States. 36 It also provided the President with both the right and the ob-
ligation "to cause the [subject property] to be seized, confiscated, and 
condemned. "37 
The Act did not explicitly distinguish between human and non-
human property; it did, however, treat the different types of property 
somewhat differently. 38 Non-human property was to be sold for the 
benefit of the United States. 39 No provision for sale was made for 
slaves; instead, the Act merely indicated that slaveowners lost their 
rights in the slaves, and that the slave would be free of the obligation 
of labor to the previous owner. 40 The First Confiscation Act did not 
clarify that slaves seized under the Act were to be emancipated. 4 1 
However, it also did not suggest that those slaves would be treated as 
U.S. government property, held or possibly sold at some later date. 42 
removed by Lincoln in January 1862); FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 15-16 (1963) (discussing 
Secretary of War Cameron's December 1861 suggestion to Lincoln that slaves be freed and 
armed, which Lincoln rejected and which may have helped precipitate Cameron's removal 
from his post) . 
33. CARNAHAN, supra note 25, at 86; ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 34 (2004). 
34. First Confiscation Act, supra note 25, § 1. 
35. Id.§ 2. 
36. Id. §§ 2, 3. 
37. Id.§ 1. 
38. See id. (noting that all property used to support the insurrection was "lawful sub-
j ect or prize and capture wherever found") . 
39. Id. § 3. 
40. Id.§ 4. 
41. See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 357 (noting that the First Confiscation Act was not 
clear on whether forfeited slaves were free , "though this was the plain inference") . 
42. The First Confiscation Act did not foreclose the theoretical possibility that slaves 
could have been transferred to the United States, with the government owning the labor 
of slaves and the proceeds of the sale of slaves being used to fight the war. Congress, how-
ever, showed no interest in having the United States own slaves and no interest in preserv-
ing slavery. See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 18 ("Despite the vagueness of the manner of 
forfeiture, Congress left no doubt that it was moving toward a policy that embraced eman-
cipation under certain conditions.") . 
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The First Confiscation Act provided at least two incentives, one 
direct and one indirect. The direct incentive was for Confederates to 
stop using their property in support of the war against the United 
States. 43 The indirect incentive was for slaves to run toward Union 
lines. 44 However ineffective the direct incentive may have been, the 
indirect incentive was effective. The tide of contraband continued 
throughout the Civil War, and the Union sought to gain advantages 
from the tide. 45 
B. The Second Confiscation Act 
By the time the Second Confiscation Act 46 was signed on July 1 7, 
1862, the character of the Civil War had changed significantly. The 
war had not ended quickly. Union forces had not been as successful 
as some thought they should have been. 47 Congress was not pleased 
with the prosecution of the war. 48 More radical elements in Congress 
and in the country were pushing for action regarding slavery and 
emancipation. 49 To some, the Second Confiscation Act was not bold 
enough.so To others, it was far too bold.s1 
43. See First Confiscation Act, supra note 25, § 1. 
44. Like the war, the First Confiscation Act may have had the benefit of encouraging 
slaves to flee their masters and get to Union lines. See Fabrikant, supra note 12, at 323 
("The [First Confiscation Act] ... sent a message that Union lines would be a safe haven 
for fugitive slaves."); Finkelman, supra note 2, at 358 ("From the beginning of the war 
slaves escaped to U.S. army lines whether they assumed (usually correctly) that they would 
find freedom.") . 
45. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877, at 45 (1965) 
("By 1865, however, some 150,000 Negroes had escaped from slavery and had either 
joined the Union Army or performed military service by digging trenches and hauling 
supplies.") . 
46. An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and 
confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for other Purposes, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589 (1862) 
[hereinafter Second Confiscation Act]. 
47. For a discussion of the travails of the Union Army in early 1862, see DAVID 
HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 348-62 (1995); see also CARNAHAN, supra note 25, at 102-03. 
48. Congress eventually instituted oversight of the Civil War effort. See FRANKLIN, su-
pra note 5, at 17-18 (discussing Congress's attempts to set war policy, including creation of 
the Committee on the Conduct of the War). 
49. See DONALD, supra note 47, at 364 (noting the numerous visitors Lincoln received 
urging emancipation); FARBER, supra note 6, at 153 (noting Congress's shift toward eman-
cipation). 
50. See HAROLD HOLZER, EMANCIPATING LINCOLN 31 (2012) (noting that abolitionists 
William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips found the Second Confiscation Act inade-
quate). 
51. See id. (noting that conservatives thought the Act might alienate border states). 
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The Second Confiscation Act was more complex than the First 
Confiscation Act. Its stated goal was "to suppress Insurrection, to pun-
ish Treason and Rebellion, [and] to seize and confiscate the Property 
of Rebels."52 Unlike the First Confiscation Act, which focused on 
property used directly in support of the war effort against the United 
States, the Second Confiscation Act targeted all property of specific 
groups of people who were fighting or supporting the war against the 
United States. 53 The Act had multiple aims. One was the confiscation 
of property. 54 Another was the emancipation of rebel-owned slaves. 55 
The first four sections of the Act focused on crimes. 56 The first 
two sections focused on the punishment for those convicted of trea-
son and for those convicted of being involved in the rebellion, includ-
ing providing aid or comfort to the rebellion. 57 The punishment for 
the criminal offense was, in part, the seizure of the defendant's prop-
erty and the liberation of the defendant's slaves. 58 The slaves need 
not have been used to support the Confederate war effort directly. 
Rather, they merely needed to be the property of people who had 
supported the war effort and had been convicted of the relevant 
crime. 59 Section three disqualified anyone convicted under the first 
two sections from holding federal office. 60 Section four noted that the 
Act was not to interfere with treason prosecutions that arose before 
the Act was passed. 61 
The Act's civil provisions focused on the confiscation of property 
as a way to hasten the end of the war. 62 Section five identified specific 
52. Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46. This is the title of the Second Confisca-
tion Act. 
53. Id. § 5. The Act could have gone farther. See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 
305-06 (1870) (noting that wartime confiscation can reach all those residing in enemy ter-
ritory whether or not they are sympathetic to the enemy government). 
54. Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 5. 
55. Id.§ 9. 
56. See Milfer, 78 U.S. at 308-10 (discussing the structure of the Second Confiscation 
Act). 
57. Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, §§ 1, 2. 
58. Id. 
59. See id. § 1 (providing for liberation of all slaves owned by persons convicted of 
treason); id. § 2 (providing for liberation of all slaves owned by persons convicted of aiding 
rebel forces) . 
60. Id.§ 3. 
61. Id.§ 4. 
62. See id. § 5 (noting that the purpose of providing the President the power to confis-
cate property was "to insure the speedy termination of the present rebellion"). 
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groups of people who were to have their property seized. 63 The 
groups included officers of the army or navy of the Confederacy, 
high-level officers in the Confederate government, and lower-level of-
ficers in Confederate state governments. 64 Section five also applied to 
"any person who, owning property in any loyal State or Territory of 
the United States, or in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter assist 
and give aid and comfort to such rebellion." 65 The President was 
charged with seizing subject property and using the proceeds from 
that property's sale to support the army. 66 
Section six of the Act authorized the President to designate an 
additional group of people whose property would be subject to sei-
zure. 67 The President was empowered to warn "any person within any 
State or Territory of the United States ... being engaged in armed 
rebellion against the government of the United States, or aiding or 
abetting such rebellion" to stop supporting the rebellion and return 
their allegiance to the United States. 68 If they did not do so within six-
ty days of the warning, their property would be subject to seizure. 69 
The President was obligated to seize the subject property and use 
proceeds from the seizure. 70 The Act provided for proceedings in rem 
-a mechanism that would speed condemnation proceedings by not 
requiring that the property's owner be granted a personal hearing re-
garding his property prior to its condemnation. 71 This mechanism 
was easier for the government to use than the mechanism provided in 
the First Confiscation Act, though confiscation through courts was not 
used particularly broadly pursuant to the First or Second Confiscation 
Act. 72 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id.§ 6. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. § 7. The in rem procedure troubled Lincoln and was part of his objection to 
the Second Confiscation Act. See Fabrikant, supra note 12, at 344 ("Lincoln found [the in 
rem provisions] objectionable on the ground that they violated the Constitution by depriv-
ing persons of property beyond their lives. "). He did not require, however, that the pro-
cedure be altered or removed from the Act before signing the law. 
72. See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 288-92 (noting that confiscations were haphazard 
and did not produce much revenue for the U.S. Treasury). 
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The Second Confiscation Act explicitly provided for the emanci-
pation of slaves, unlike the First Confiscation Act. 73 Congressmen un-
derstood the difference between confiscating slaves-either to stop 
their owners from using them to make war against the government or 
to punish them for making war on the United States-and freeing 
those slaves. 74 The nod toward emancipation was significant. It made 
clear that confiscation was not merely about trading one set of mas-
ters for another, but that confiscation was meant to free slaves. 75 
The substance of the emancipation portion of the Act is signifi-
cant. The Act freed any slave who escaped into Union lines, was cap-
tured from his master, or was found in a place that had been occu-
pied by rebel forces, if the slave's master had engaged in rebellion or 
had "in any way give [n] aid or comfort" to the rebellion. 76 The Act 
stated that those slaves "shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be 
forever free of their servitude, and not again held as slaves."77 The Act 
noted that a fugitive slave could be returned to his owner, if the per-
son claiming the fugitive swore an oath that the slave's owner "ha[d] 
not borne arms against the United States in the present rebellion, nor 
in any way given aid and comfort thereto." 78 Members of the armed 
forces, however, could not be party to surrendering fugitive slaves or 
returning fugitive slaves to their owners. 79 Slaves who ran away to the 
Union lines were effectively free for the duration of the war. 
Lastly, the Second Confiscation Act authorized the President to 
use "persons of African descent as he may deem necessary and proper 
for the suppression of this rebellion," freeing the President to use 
seized, freed, and escaped slaves in the military. 80 Of course, Presi-
dent Lincoln may already have had the power to use whatever re-
73. See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 9; see also Fabrikant, supra note 12, at 
340 (" [S] ection nine of the [Second Confiscation Act] expressly granted freedom, whereas 
the [First Confiscation Act] spoke only in terms of 'forfeiture."'). 
74. See WILSON, supra note 20, at 127 (noting that during the debate on the Second 
Confiscation Act congressmen briefly mentioned and rejected the possibility of treating 
slaves as forfeited property and selling them into the market). 
75 . See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 358-59 (noting that slaves were treated differently 
than property under the Second Confiscation Act and did not appear subject to the oner-
ous forfeiture procedures applicable to other property). 
76. Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 9. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. § 10; see also RANDALL, supra note 18, at 357 (noting that loyal slaveholders in 
Union states could recover their fugitive slaves until fugitive slave laws were repealed in 
mid-1864). 
79. Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 10. 
80. Id.§ 11. 
2013] LINCOLN AND EXECUTIVE POWER 111 
sources he needed to win the war under his commander-in-chief pow-
er. 81 After the Department of War supported General Butler's decla-
ration that runaway slaves were to be contraband of war and his use of 
the contrabands to support the war effort, the Second Confiscation 
Act could be deemed functionally superfluous on this point. Howev-
er, the additional congressional sanction to use blacks to support the 
Union cause was important if only to signal that Congress supported 
the President on the issue. 82 
The Confiscation Acts, taken together, allowed slaves used 
against the United States to be seized.83 They allowed slaves of rebels 
fighting against the United States to be freed. They also allowed Pres-
ident Lincoln to decide what additional people would be subject to 
having their property, including slaves, confiscated or liberated. Fi-
nally, the Confiscation Acts gave President Lincoln the authority to 
use confiscated and runaway slaves in the military in support of the 
war effort. The two Confiscation Acts alone suggest that Congress was 
tilting toward emancipation. 84 
C. Other Legislation 
Before the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, Congress 
passed additional legislation suggesting it was becoming more com-
fortable with emancipation. Between the First Confiscation Act and 
the Second Confiscation Act, Congress passed legislation prohibiting 
military officials from returning fugitive slaves to their masters, with 
President Lincoln signing the law on March 13, 1862.85 Congress also 
passed the Militia Act of 1862, which President Lincoln signed into 
law on July 17, 1862-the same day he signed the Second Confisca-
81. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
82. Unfortunately, the Second Confiscation Act was not solely focused on bringing 
slaves into the American polity. It provided for the possible colonization of freed slaves to 
a country outside of the United States. See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 12. 
83. The Acts were found to be constitutional. See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 
313-14 (1870) ("Upon the whole, then, we are of opinion the confiscation acts are not 
unconstitutional .... "). 
84. See FARBER, supra note 6, at 153 (2003) ("Congress began to move in the direction 
of emancipation with two Confiscation Acts, providing a mechanism to free the slaves of 
active rebels on a case-by-case basis."); RANDALL, supra note 18, at 342 (suggesting that the 
Confiscation Acts were steps toward emancipation). 
85. An Act to make an additional Article of War, ch. 40, 12 Stat. 354 (1862) [hereinaf-
ter Additional Article of War]. The effect was to provide extra support to the war cause. 
See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 366 (discussing contraband policy that essentially emanci-
pated the slaves of rebel slaveholders and used the labor of slaves of loyal slaveholders 
(possibly to be compensated later upon claim by the loyal slaveholders)). 
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tion Act. B6 This Act authorized using blacks in the military;B7 specifi-
cally, it granted freedom to any former slave who rendered military 
service under the Act if that slave had been owned by someone who 
levied war on the United States or had given aid or comfort to ene-
mies of the United States during the rebellion. BB In addition, the 
former slave's mother, wife, and children would be free based on the 
former slave's military service if the mother, wife, and children had 
been owned by someone who had levied war or given aid or comfort 
to the enemies of the United States.B9 When taken together, the Acts 
suggest that the government did not intend to use military power to 
preserve slavery. Rather, the government intended to emancipate 
many slaves who rendered service to the war effort. 
Congress also abolished slavery in areas where it had the clear 
power to do so. Congress abolished slavery in the District of Colum-
bia, with President Lincoln signing the law on April 16, 1862.9° Con-
gress also abolished slavery in the U.S. territories, with President Lin-
coln signing the law on June 19, 1862.9 1 Neither of these actions, 
however, is the equivalent of general emancipation, and may not be 
considered particularly radical. 92 The Republican platform on which 
86. The Militia Act ofl862, ch. 201 , 12 Stat. 597 (1862). 
87. Id. § 12. 
88. Id. § 13; see also RANDALL, supra note 18, at 364 (discussing the Militia Act of 1862: 
"It was rather surprising that this law did not at the same time provide similar freedom for 
slave-soldiers owned by loyal masters, with compensation to such masters, for it was widely 
recognized that no Negro who had served under the colors should be reenslaved."). This 
was fixed by an Act of February 24, 1864. Id. at 364 n.46; DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at 4~1 
("By the act of February 24, 1864, 'all able-bodied male colored persons' between the ages 
of twenty and forty-five were drafted for military service. This law covered Negroes who 
were slaves as well as Negroes who were free. Siaveowners in the Border States, which had 
not seceded, violently objected to the taking of their slaves without compensation. . . . So 
the act provided that when a slave was taken into the Army from the Border States, his 
master should receive a sum of money (from $100 to $300) and the slave should become a 
free man."). 
89. The Militia Act of 1862, supra note 86, § 13. 
90. D.C. Emancipation Act, ch. 54, 12 Stat. 376 (1862). See also Fabrikant, supra note 
12, at 337 ("The D.C. Emancipation Act was the first federal law which granted immediate 
and unconditional freedom to any slave.") . 
91. An Act to secure Freedom to all persons within the Territories of the United 
States, ch. 111, 12 Stat. 432 (1862) [hereinafter the Territories Act] . This law functionally 
nullified Dred Scott v. Sanford on the issue of slavery in the territories. See TSESIS, supra note 
33, at 35. 
92. Going farther might have been considered radical. See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 
358 ("[A]ny national program for emancipation beyond the territories or the District of 
Columbia did not fit into any generally recognized interpretation of the Constitution.") ; 
see also Rierson, supra note 18, at 839 (noting that Lincoln opposed the expansion of slav-
ery into the territories, but did not campaign on the abolition of slavery in the states). 
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Lincoln ran in 1860 favored the abolition of slavery in the territories, 93 
and some who favored compensated emancipation supported stop-
ping the spread of slavery wherever possible. 94 Nonetheless, the aActs 
suggest that Congress was willing to move toward emancipation wher-
ever possible, rather than toward appeasing slaveholders whenever 
.bl 95 poss1 e. 
D. Implications 
Taken together, all of the laws mentioned above suggest that 
Congress was willing to emancipate slaves whenever it thought it was 
reasonable to support the war effort and wherever it thought it had 
the authority to do so. The latitude the laws explicitly gave President 
Lincoln suggests that he had significant power to affect slavery direct-
ly. President Lincoln had been given the authority to seize property, 
to liberate slaves as a result, and to use black Americans militarily 
whenever appropriate to help suppress the rebellion. 96 President Lin-
coln was specifically given the authority and duty to confiscate and 
condemn property that had been used directly against the United 
States in support of the rebellion. 97 President Lincoln was also specif-
ically given the authority and duty to seize the property of certain 
groups of people living inside of the Confederate states, and of those 
living inside of loyal states if they supported or gave aid to the rebel-
lion. 98 Further, President Lincoln was specifically given the authority 
to issue a proclamation giving notice to people living in Confederate 
states that he could seize the property of people in those states who 
continued to aid or abet the rebellion. 99 
President Lincoln was also authorized to use people of African 
descent in the armed forces as he saw fit. 100 President Lincoln could 
use now-former slaves and free blacks to supplement the troops 
fighting the war, and presumably could encourage former slaves to 
93. See Andrew T. Hyman, The Due Process Plank, 43 SETON HALL L. REv. 229, 230 
(201 3) (discussing the antislavery plank of the Republican Party platform of 1860). 
94. President Lincoln could be counted in this group. See FRA.i"IKLIN, supra note 5, at 
21-22 (discussing President Lincoln 's efforts in favor of compensated emancipation). 
95. See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 364 (noting the various ways in which Congress 
sought to and did emancipate slaves leading up to the Emancipation Proclamation) . 
96. See supra Parts l.A- C. 
97. See supra Part IA. 
98. See supra Part LB. 
99. See supra Part l.B. 
100. See supraPartI .C. 
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become a part of the armed forces to help suppress the rebellion. IOI 
This was a significant step, as some did not want to see African Ameri-
cans become part of the armed forces, either because they did not 
want to make the war about slavery or because they believed that the 
psychological effect black soldiers might have on the South would 
guarantee a prolonged or more savage rebellion. Io2 In the wake of be-
ing granted these powers and duties through legislation, President 
Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. 
II. THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 
The Emancipation Proclamation was issued in the wake of signif-
icant legislation that supported the confiscation and emancipation of 
slaves as war policy and as general policy. 103 The Emancipation Proc-
lamation, however, is not generally considered an extension of con-
gressional legislation; rather, it tends to be considered the action of 
President Lincoln alone, even though it lacked his signature linguistic 
flair. 104 The full story is more complex. When commentators discuss 
the Emancipation Proclamation, they often refer primarily to the 
101. See supra Part I.C. 
102. Interestingly, some Confederates would have liked to have seen slaves take up 
arms in support of the Confederacy. See EMORY M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE NATION: 
1861-1865, at 261-64 (1979) (discussing General Pauick Cleburne's suggestion in early 
1864 that the most loyal slaves be armed and promised freedom if they fought for the war's 
duration, and noting its sound rejection at the time). Indeed, eventually, the Confederacy 
did arm former slaves, but only after their masters freed them. Rather than have them 
fight as slaves with the promise of emancipation, the Confederacy eventually decided to 
allow some slaves to fight as free men. See DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at 42-43 (noting the 
Confederacy's eventual willingness to allow slaves to serve in the military in exchange for 
possible freedom) ; THOMAS, supra, at 290-96 (discussing Confederate move in late 1864 to 
arm and emancipate slaves whose masters allowed them to fight for the Confederacy). 
103. See supra Part I. 
104. The dryness of the Emancipation Proclamation may have been due to Lincoln's 
desire to ensure its constitutionality. See Adkins, supra note 6, at 245-46 ("Lincoln faced a 
serious constitutional challenge to his Emancipation Proclamation from a number of 
prominent critics who concluded Lincoln had no constitutional authority to issue such a 
document .... Lincoln had to carefully craft the proclamation into a dry legal document, 
denying to it Lincoln 's command of beautiful prose."); BURI..INGAME, supra note 31, at 68 
(noting the "cold, legalistic language" of the Emancipation Proclamation); FARBER, supra 
note 6, at 154 (''The Emancipation Proclamation was not up to Lincoln's usual standard of 
eloquence, but it said what it needed to say."); Finkelman, supra note 2, at 351 (noting that 
stylistically, the Emancipation Proclamation was not Lincolnesque). President Lincoln 
had reason to worry. See JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOL AND CHIEF J USTICE TANEY 222 (2006) 
("Given the opportunity, there is no doubt that Taney would have declared Lincoln's 
Emancipation Proclamation unconstitutional. He could have documented his conclusion 
by citing his own judicial opinions in Straderv. Graham (1851), Dred Scott (1857) , and Mer-
ryman (1861)."). 
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proclamation issued on January 1, 1863. 105 The Preliminary Emanci-
pation Proclamation, issued on September 22, 1862, 106 however, pro-
vides context for the final Emancipation Proclamation. Indeed, the 
final proclamation was arguably just a confirmation, in somewhat dif-
ferent language, of the preliminary proclamation. 107 
The Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation was issued just after 
the Battle of Antietam. 108 President Lincoln considered issuing the 
Emancipation Proclamation throughout much of the summer of 
1862. '09 Secretary of State Seward, however, advised President Lincoln 
that issuing the Emancipation Proclamation during a difficult time for 
the Union army would make the Proclamation appear to be a desper-
ate ploy. 11° Consequently, Lincoln waited until after a Union victo-
ry. 111 When issued, the Emancipation Proclamation was welcomed by 
some and decried by others. 112 It was, however, undeniably momen-
tous. 
A. The Preliminary Proclamation 
The Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation began with a state-
ment of purpose declaring that President Lincoln, as President and 
Commander in Chief, planned to restore the Union. 113 It then sug-
gested that the rebellious states should rejoin the Union and accept 
105. Proclamation No. 17 (Emancipation Proclamation), 12 Stat. 1268 (Jan. 1, 1863) 
[hereinafter Emancipation Proclamation]. 
106. Proclamation No. 16 (Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation), 12 Stat. 1267 
(Sept. 22, 1862) [hereinafter Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation]. 
107. Compare Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 106, with Emancipa-
tion Proclamation, supra note 105. 
108. DONALD, supra note 47, at 374. 
109. See id. at 362-65 (discussing President Lincoln's thinking during the summer of 
1862 about issuing an emancipation order). 
llO. See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 43 (noting Secretary Seward's concerns regarding 
the timing of the Emancipation Proclamation). 
ll l. Some did not consider Antietam to be much of a victory, but Lincoln thought it 
was good enough. See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 46-47 (noting that the Union victory at 
Antietam was the trigger for issuing the Emancipation Proclamation); WILBUR, supra note 
20, at 68-69 (discussing positive military results for the Union in early 1862 and noting 
that popular opinion had suggested that early 1862 had been a poor time for the Union's 
military fortunes). But see Adkins, supra note 6, at 248 ("That Lincoln issued the proclama-
tion when he did is almost as inexplicable as his motives. The Union had suffered a long 
series of military setbacks, and the war had been unexpectedly prolonged."). 
112. See TSESIS, supra note 33, at 36 (discussing reactions to the Emancipation Procla-
mation). 
113. Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 106, para. 1. 
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gradual emancipation and the colonization of slaves. 114 The prelimi-
nary Proclamation noted that, barring reconciliation, "all persons 
held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the peo-
ple whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States shall 
be then, thenceforward, and forever free." 115 The preliminary Proc-
lamation indicated that the President would, on January 1, 1863, indi-
cate the areas of the United States to which the Proclamation would 
apply. 116 It further stated that the government, including the military, 
would recognize the freedom of slaves and do nothing to impede the 
exercise of their freedom. 117 The preliminary Proclamation conclud-
ed with a pledge from President Lincoln that he would recommend, 
after the restoration of the Union, that loyalists "be compensated for 
all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves." 118 
The preliminary Proclamation noted statutory support for its is-
suance. 119 It noted the law, passed March 13, 1862, prohibiting the 
military from helping to return fugitive slaves to their owners. 120 It 
referenced section nine of the Second Confiscation Act, which freed 
slaves of persons engaged in rebellion or who had given aid or com-
fort to the rebellion, whenever those slaves came under the U.S. Ar-
my's control. 121 Finally, it noted section ten of the Second Confisca-
tion Act, which barred the return of fugitive slaves unless the person 
seeking the fugitive slave swore an oath that the owner of the slave 
had not participated in the rebellion or given aid or comfort to the 
rebellion, and which also reiterated that the military would not partic-
ipate in the return of fugitive slaves. 122 Lincoln suggested that these 
laws, coupled with his commander-in-chief power, provided the au-
thority to free all slaves in areas in rebellion against the United 
114. Id. para. 2. 
115. Id. para. 3. 
116. Id. para. 4. 
117. Id. para. 3. 
118. Id. para. 13. 
119. See CARNAHAN, supra note 25, at 108 (noting that President Llncoln referenced 
legislation likely to make the Emancipation Proclamation appear less radical and merely 
the result of carrying out Congress's legislative commands); see also FRANKLIN, supra note 5, 
at 48 (noting that obedience to the Second Confiscation Act and an Additional Article of 
War would lead to much emancipation and suggesting that the Emancipation Proclama-
tion was a continuation of those acts). 
120. Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 106, paras. 5-8 (quoting an 
Additional Article of War). 
121. Id. para. 10. 
122. Id. para. 11. 
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States. 123 The preliminary Proclamation was met with mixed reac-
tion. 124 The final Proclamation would be met with similar mixed reac-
tion. 
B. The Final Proclamation 
By January 1, 1863, when the final Emancipation Proclamation 
was issued, circumstances had changed. The congressional elections 
of 1862 had occurred; President Lincoln's Republican Party had been 
trounced. 125 Some anxiously awaited the issuance of the final Procla-
mation, not knowing whether President Lincoln would make the an-
nouncement. 126 President Lincoln did not waver. He issued the final 
Emancipation Proclamation freeing slaves in the areas of the Confed-
eracy that remained in rebellion. 127 
The final Proclamation confirmed the preliminary Proclamation. 
However, the final Proclamation focused somewhat more centrally on 
the President's commander-in-chief power, stating that the Proclama-
tion was "a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing the rebel-
lion."128 President Lincoln identified the areas in the United States 
not under the Union's effective political or military control, deemed 
them to be in rebellion, and declared that all slaves living in those ar-
eas were free. 129 He stated: 
I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within 
said designated States, and parts of States, are, and hence-
forward shall be free; and that the Executive government of 
the United States, including the military and naval authori-
123. See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 48-49 ("As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
Navy, Lincoln referred to his military powers as the source of his authority to emancipate 
the slaves. . . . He hoped, finally, to bring about legislative and executive coopera-
tion . . . . "). 
124. See id. at 58-93 (discussing the favorable and unfavorable reactions to the prelimi-
nary Proclamation domestically and internationally). 
125. See Yoo, supra note 3, at 2015 (noting the 1862 midterm election results). Indeed, 
some had wondered if the 1862 midterm elections would stop Lincoln from issuing the 
Emancipation Proclamation. See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 86. 
126. See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 93 (discussing watch parties and anticipation of the 
issuance of the final Emancipation Proclamation). 
127. Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 105. 
128. Id. para. 4. Of course, much of the legislation passed prior to the Emancipation 
Proclamation reflected Congress's views of what qualified as fit measures for ending the 
rebellion. See supra Parts I.A-C. 
129. Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 105, paras. 4-6. 
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ties thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said 130 persons. 
The Proclamation then noted that the then-former slaves could join 
the United States armed forces. 131 
The Emancipation Proclamation could be thought to be a decla-
ration that every slaveholder in the areas under rebellion was aiding 
and abetting the rebellion. That would subject all of their property, 
including their slaves, to forfeiture. 132 Given the Preliminary Emanci-
pation Proclamation's suggestion that loyalists living in areas con-
trolled by rebel forces might have claims after the war for compensa-
tion for destroyed property, 133 however, it is unlikely that the final 
Emancipation Proclamation should be deemed to treat everyone in 
such areas as collaborating with the Confederacy. Rather than con-
demning the motives and actions of all persons living in areas in re-
bellion, the Emancipation Proclamation arguably merely subjected to 
confiscation the human property of all subjects-loyal and disloyal-
living in areas in rebellion, withoutjudgment. 134 
The preliminary and final Proclamations were met with joy by 
some, but were not universally hailed by those who supported eman-
cipation.135 Although the Emancipation Proclamation stated United 
States war policy, declared free slaves in much of the United States, 
and indicated that national policy was to maintain the freedom of the 
newly freed slaves, it did not abolish slavery or free all slaves. 136 In-
deed, it did not free slaves in areas of the Confederacy that were un-
der Union control. 137 This reality led some to argue that the Procla-
130. Id. para. 6. 
131. Id. para. 8; see FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 104 (noting that the final Emancipation 
Proclamation indicated that former slaves were to be welcomed into the armed forces, 
whereas the preliminary Proclamation had not). 
132. The Court in Miller v. United States would have supported much more confiscation 
than the Emancipation Proclamation provided. 78 U.S. 268, 306 (1870) (noting that con-
fiscation of all property of loyalists living in the Confederacy would have been constitu-
tional). 
133. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text. 
135. See F'RANKLIN, supra note 5, at 141-43 (noting that the Emancipation Proclamation 
was not all that abolitionists wanted, but was treated as momentous nonetheless); TSESIS, 
supra note 33, at 36 (same) . 
136. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
137. See id. However, the practical effect of the Emancipation Proclamation was more 
complex. See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 114-15 (referring to an Emancipation Proclama-
tion celebration in Norfolk, where the Proclamation did not technically free slaves: "This 
was an example, however, of what happened to slavery when Union forces won control of 
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mation only "freed" slaves in areas where the Union had no practical 
power to free slaves. 138 President Lincoln countered that the Emanci-
pation Proclamation, a war measure, could only free slaves in areas 
still in rebellion and not yet under Union control. 139 As for the bigger 
issue of full emancipation, President Lincoln clung to the hope that 
states would accept gradual compensated emancipation. 140 Indeed, 
he proposed gradual compensated emancipation in his December 
1862 message to Congress delivered between the issuance of the pre-
liminary Proclamation and the final Proclamation. 141 Whether the 
Emancipation Proclamation is thought to be a water glass half-empty 
or half-full, the more interesting question is whether the Executive's 
an area: slavery merely ceased to exist, the exceptions in the Emancipation Proclamation 
to the contrary notwithstanding."). 
138. See WILLIE LEE ROSE, REHEARSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTIO : THE PORT ROYAL 
EXPERIMENT 195-96 (1964) ("The Proclamation had in general emancipated only the 
slaves outside the grasp of the Federal armies and had gone to the lengths of specifically 
excluding from its liberating provisions the Negroes within [Union] lines . . . . "). There 
were anomalies. Slaves on coastal islands in South Carolina, who had been practically free 
and under Union Control since late 1861, were freed by the Emancipation Proclamation. 
See id. at 196. 
139. Lincoln's point was both legal and political. Freeing slaves in areas under Union 
control would be akin to freeing slaves in free states in the Union. See JAMES M. 
MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 298 (1982) ("The 
proclamation was a war measure directed against enemy resources. Under the laws of war, 
the President and army had the right to seize these resources; but they had no constitu-
tional power over slaves not owned by the enemy."); VORENBERG, supra note 27, at 35 
("But many northerners doubted the constitutionality of emancipation in nonrebellious 
areas, and even more questioned whether black freedom would be constitutional after the 
war had ended."); see also DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at vi ("The Emancipation Proclamation, 
like the Magna Charta, has become a symbol of freedom and equality which was no part of 
it in the beginning. Lincoln conceived of it as a military measure. It indeed freed only 
some slaves, not all of them."). 
140. Gradual compensation emancipation would have resolved issues of the Proclama-
tion's constitutionality that revolved around the Constitution's Takings Clause. See 
Finkelman, supra note 2, at 350 (suggesting that Emancipation Proclamation may have vio-
lated the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause); see also Levinson, supra note 1, at 1149 (not-
ing argument that, but for the Fourteenth Amendment, emancipation might be better 
thought to be a taking under the Fifth Amendment that would require compensation); 
Yoo, supra note 3, at 2014 ("The Emancipation Proclamation is usually studied as a ques-
tion of the war powers of the national government, though it has also been studied as a 
question of whether it amounted to a taking of property requiring compensation."). Some 
argue that the takings argument is a loser. See FARBER, supra note 6, at 156 ("One possible 
argument is that [the Emancipation Proclamation] violated the takings clause. But this 
argument should fail. ... The government's power to seize enemy property when required 
for military purposes predated the Constitution, and must be considered an implicit con-
dition on title to all real and personal property."). 
141. See STAMPP, supra note 45, at 45 (noting Lincoln 's offer of gradual compensated 
emancipation to states in late 1862 after the issuance of the preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation) . 
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duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" provided Lin-
coln with the authority to start pouring water at all. 
III. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 
The President of the United States is vested with the executive 
authority of the federal government.142 The executive authority in-
cludes several duties and powers, including the commander-in-chief 
power and the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 143 
Determining the boundaries of executive power is a fascinating and 
difficult task. 144 This Essay focuses specifically on the Take Care 
Clause and whether it may have authorized the Emancipation Proc-
lamation. 
For the purposes of analyzing the Take Care Clause, all legisla-
tion passed by Congress before the Proclamation's promulgation is 
assumed to be constitutional. That assumption is necessary to isolate 
the take care issue. The Take Care Clause is triggered when legisla-
tion exists for the President to execute faithfully. 145 Whether the Pres-
142. U.S. CONST. art. II§ l. 
143. Id. at. §§ 2-3. The scope of those powers can be elastic. See William G. Howell, 
Wartime Judgments of Presidential Power: Striking Down but Not Back, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1778, 
1788 (2009) (noting that robust commander-in-chief power can lead to extra-
constitutional actions by the President). Opinion regarding the scope of executive power 
can vary, as was demonstrated in 1860-1861 . See Yoo, supra note 3, at 2007-08 (contrasting 
President Lincoln's self-professed constitutional authority to address secession with Presi-
dent Buchanan's self-professed lack of constitutional authority to do so). 
144. The most extensive attempt to map the limits of executive power as it interacts 
with the legislative power may have occurred in Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice Jackson provided a struc-
ture for evaluating the proper breadth of executive power in relation to legislative power. 
See id. at 635 Qackson, J., concurring) ("Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate , 
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress."). The Execu-
tive is most free to act when the President acts pursuant to an explicit congressional au-
thorization. Id. If the President's act is unconstitutional in this setting, it is likely because 
the government as a whole cannot act as the President did. Id. at 636-37. Thus, the Exec-
utive is more limited in acting when Congress has not spoken. Congress and the President 
may have concurrent authority, but the distribution of that authority may be unclear. Id. 
at 637. The Executive is constrained to act exclusively based on his inherent executive 
powers when the President acts in contravention of expressed congressional policy. Id. In 
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the Court praised Justice Jackson 's three-
tiered power structure, but recognized that it did not easily resolve issues in actual cases. 
See id. at 669 ("[I] t is doubtless the case that executive action in any particular instance 
falls, not neatly in one of Qustice Jackson 's] three pigeonholes, but rather at some point 
along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congres-
sional prohibition."). 
145. See Levinson, supra note l, at 1142 ("Even if the national government is deemed to 
have certain powers, the President still needs congressional authorization for his actions. 
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ident has faithfully executed the legislation arguably does not depend 
on whether the legislation is constitutional. Rather, it depends on 
whether the President's take care power authorizes the actions taken 
pursuant to the underlying legislation. Though important, an analysis 
of the constitutionality of the legislation enacted before the Emanci-
pation Proclamation was issued would be lengthy ·and is outside of the 
scope of this brief Essay. A brief discussion of the Take Care Clause is 
necessary before the Clause is considered in conjunction with the 
Emancipation Proclamation. 
A. Take Care Clause 
The boundaries of the Take Care Clause, like the boundaries of 
executive power in general, are difficult to map. 146 The Clause resides 
in section three of Article II of the Constitution with a number of 
other powers and duties given to the President. 147 The Supreme 
Court has not given much guidance regarding the limits of the Take 
Care Clause. 148 Consequently, the scope of the Clause remains un-
clear. 149 Nonetheless, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer150 ("Steel 
Seizure') remains instructive on the reach of the Take Care Clause. 
The Steel Seizure case did not create clear boundaries for the Take 
Care Clause, but it did provide a few helpful signposts. The Court re-
viewed President Truman's seizure of the nation's steel plants during 
This, after all, is the heart of Youngstown Stee~ which would have been an absolutely easy 
case had Congress authorized the [steel] seizure in advance."). 
146. For a discussion of the breadth of judicial and scholarly commentary on the scope 
of the Take Care Clause, see Norman W. Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the 
Department of justice, 63 STAN. L. REV. 409, 430 n.75 (2011). 
147. See U.S. CONST. art. II§ 3 (stipulating presidential duties to provide information to 
Congress regarding the state of the union, convene and adjourn Congress, receive ambas-
sadors and others, and commission officers of the United States, in addition to "take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed"). 
148. See Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381, 
409-10 (2001) ("Commentators generally agree that at least one purpose of the [Take 
Care] clause was to make it clear the president cannot arbitrarily suspend the enforcement 
of laws enacted by Congress. Beyond this, however, relatively little is known about the 
original meaning of the Take Care Clause, and there similarly are relatively few cases in 
which the Supreme Court has discussed its breadth."). 
149. See Michele Estrin Gilman, The President as Scientist-in-Chief, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
565, 577 (2009) ("Not only is [its] language vague, but the history surrounding the Take 
Care Clause is inconclusive because the Framers themselves disagreed over the proper 
scope of executive power . . .. This uncertainty creates an opening for Presidents to justify 
their domestic policymaking under the Take Care Clause."). 
150. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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the Korean War. 15 1 Rather than allow a labor dispute at the plants to 
resolve itself, and possibly result in a disruptive strike, President Tru-
man determined that he had the constitutional authority to seize the 
plants and keep them producing. 152 President Truman argued that a 
strike at the plants would jeopardize national defense by disrupting 
the production of steel during the Korean War. 153 The Court, howev-
er, determined that President Truman did not have the authority to 
. th 1 154 seize e p ants. 
The Court analyzed President Truman's claim that the Take Care 
Clause and the commander-in-chief power combined to provide the 
authority sufficient to seize the steel plants. 155 Rather than accept that 
the President had the inherent authority to seize the plants under the 
relevant circumstances, the Court noted that the President may act 
only pursuant to an explicit or implied grant of power from the Con-
stitution or a statute. 156 After dispensing with the argument that the 
commander-in-chief power authorized the seizure, 157 the Court ad-
dressed the content of the Take Care Clause. The Court viewed the 
Take Care Clause as a limited grant of power to the President; it al-
lows the President to shape the executive response to legislation, but 
does not allow the President to invade the legislative power that the 
Constitution assigns to Congress. 158 The Legislature sets policy; the 
Executive implements that policy. 159 In sum, when Congress has ex-
plicitly stated the policy it wants followed, the President is limited in 
following a different path. Conversely, when the President follows 
Congress's lead, the President will have more latitude in crafting a 
policy response to a situation. The Steel Seizure Court provided little 
additional analysis of the Take Care Clause. 
151. See id. at 582 (discussing the genesis of the seizure). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 583. 
154. Id. at 588-89. 
155. Id. at 587. 
156. Id. at 585 ("The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from 
an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself. There is no statute that expressly au-
thorizes the President to take possession of property as he did here. Nor is there any act of 
Congress to which our attention has been directed from which such a power can fairly be 
implied."). 
157. Id. at 587 (noting that the seizure of mills is not a military matter). 
158. Id. ("In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the 
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution 
limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise 
and the vetoing oflaws he thinks bad."). 
159. Id. at 588. 
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In the wake of the Court's limited discussions of the Take Care 
Clause, the Clause can be considered to provide both a duty requiring 
the Executive to enforce the law as the legislation demands and a li-
cense allowing the President to interpret statutes in the context of de-
termining how to enforce them. 160 What the Take Care Clause allows 
the President to do depends on how broad the President's job is con-
ceived to be. If the President's job with respect to executing the law is 
to do only what legislation commands the President to do, the Take 
Care Clause will be viewed narrowly. Conversely, if the President's job 
is to execute legislative policy reflected by all of federal law, the lati-
tude the Take Care Clause provides can be viewed expansively. Even 
when viewed expansively, however, the Clause will always have lim-
its. 161 The President can only interpret the law in the context of exe-
cuting it. 162 The President cannot interpret the law so aggressively 
that the President functionally legislates. 163 Where the line between 
160. See FARBER, supra note 6, at 128-29 (noting the difficulty in using the Take Care 
Clause to extend presidential authority because "[i] t is phrased as a duty rather than a 
grant of power"); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 CO LUM. 
L. REV. 1432, 1471 (1988) ("The 'take Care' clause, however, is a duty, not a license. The 
clause requires the President to carry out the law as enacted by Congress."); see also Thom-
as P. Crocker, Presidential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1551, 1576 
(2011) ("The Take Care Clause's meaning is not without its own ambiguity. Is it an as-
signment of power, as some argue, or a designation of a duty, as many others argue?"). 
Indeed, some argue that the clause restrains the President. See id. at 1554 (arguing that 
the need to take care that laws are faithfully executed is a restraint on the President). 
161. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, Lincoln viewed his com-
mission broadly. See Adkins, supra note 6, at 243 ("Lincoln construed his oath and the 
'take care' clause to mean that he was responsible for preserving the Union."). 
162. See Neomi Rao, The President's Sphere of Action, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 527, 546 
(2009) ("To faithfully execute the laws, the President must ensure that various statutory 
policies and directives work together to create coherent government action. Generating 
such coherence from our myriad laws will often require detailed and sometimes creative 
interpretation.") ; Yoo, supra note 3, at 1947 ("[The Constitution] grants perhaps the most 
significant executive power, that of taking 'Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' in 
the president alone. The Take Care Clause makes the president responsible for enforcing 
federal law, which implies an ancillary authority to interpret it in the course of enforce-
ment."). 
163. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (noting that the Take Care Clause 
"allows the President to execute the laws, not make them"); FARBER, supra note 6, at 129 
("The 'take care' clause presumably does give the president some discretion in implement-
ing the laws. But it arguably undermines inherent executive power by stressing the presi-
dent's subordinate role with respect to the lawgivers."); Spaulding, supra note 146, at 437 
("However we read the Take Care Clause, it cannot mean that the President is free to exe-
cute his will rather than the laws.") . Some argue that any grant of power the Take Care 
Clause provides is not broad. See Crocker, supra note 160, at 1576 ("The Supreme Court 
has never provided a full exposition of the [take care] clause, and certainly not one that 
establishe~ a robust grant of power."). 
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executing the law and legislating resides, however, is difficult to de-
termine. 
Of course, the President must interpret statutes to enforce them. 
Even at its most restrictive, the Take Care Clause presumably allows 
the President to interpret a statute to determine what the President is 
required to do under the statute. 164 If treated more expansively, the 
Take Care Clause may allow the President to interpret the maze of 
federal law to determine how the law should best be executed con-
sistent with congressional intent. 165 Any interpretation by the Execu-
tive must be faithful to the statutes, but a reasonable amount of inter-
pretive latitude may allow the President to embed the President's 
policy preferences-consistent with Congress's preferences-in the 
interpretation. 166 Whether the President has acted consistently with 
the Take Care Clause may depend on how clearly the President's vi-
sion tracks Congress's vision for a particular issue. 167 This is important 
in considering how the Take Care Clause may have authorized the is-
suance of the Emancipation Proclamation. 
164. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
165. The take care power that is being suggested here is not in the form of an emer-
gency power, but in the form of a typical interpretation of legislation that has been duly 
passed. There is an argument, however, that the Take Care Clause provides the President 
emergency powers that are not explicitly noted in the Constitution. See Thaddeus Hoff-
meister, An Insurrection Act for the Twenty-First Century, 39 STETSON L. REV. 861, 883 n.132 
(2010). How broad that power may be is subject to debate. See Howell, supra note 143, at 
1789-90 (noting that the Take Care Clause does not explicitly distinguish between peace-
time and wartime, but effectively can provide the President with additional power given 
that many statutes provide the President with additional power during emergencies) . 
However, wartime does not expand the Executive's power into the legislative realm. See 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) ('The Founders of this 
Nation entrusted the law making power to the Congress alone in both good and bad 
times."). 
166. See Sunstein, supra note 160, at 1471 ("[The Take Care Clause) does accord to the 
President-and no one else-the authority to control the execution of the law when Con-
gress has not spoken, and that authority will involve a measure of discretion."). Some sug-
gest that any discretion allowed should be exercised carefully. See Crocker, supra note 160, 
at 1558 (suggesting that duties to take care and faithfully execute the laws "places virtue at 
the center of the president's powers"). 
167. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678, 680 (1981) ("Although we 
have declined to conclude that the IEEPA or the Hostage Act directly authorizes the Pres-
ident's suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor of 
Congress' legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting 
alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. . . . Crucial to our decision today is the 
conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by exec-
utive agreement.".). 
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B. The Take Care Clause and Emancipation Proclamation 
Whether the Take Care Clause authorized President Lincoln to 
issue the Emancipation Proclamation would seem to depend in part 
on whether, in issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, President 
Lincoln lagged or outpaced Congress. The former view suggests that 
the Emancipation Proclamation merely pushed the emancipation is-
sue that Congress had set in motion with its prior legislation. 168 If 
emancipation was clearly coming, the Emancipation Proclamation 
could be thought to be a mere continuation of congressional policy 
that was likely within the President's executive authority. 169 Converse-
ly, the Emancipation Proclamation arguably was a bold step toward 
freedom well beyond what Congress had authorized or contemplated. 
If the Emancipation Proclamation was a break with or a radical depar-
ture from congressional action, it is less likely to have been within the 
President's take care authority. 170 Ironically, the Emancipation Proc-
lamation's value as proof of President Lincoln's greatness may be in-
versely proportional to its apparent constitutionality. 171 
An examination of the constitutionality of the Emancipation 
Proclamation requires consideration of the legislation that preceded 
it. At the time the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, Congress 
had legislated differently with respect to three groups of slaves. 172 The 
first group consisted of slaves held by disloyal masters. 173 The second 
group consisted of slaves who escaped or ended up behind Union 
lines during the war, but were held by loyal masters. 174 The third 
168. See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 20-21 (noting that Congress was in front of Lincoln 
on emancipation issues and that Lincoln held Congress back). 
169. The Emancipation Proclamation could have been thought to implement the Sec-
ond Confiscation Act in part, especially because there had been confusion about how the 
military was to enforce the Act. See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 361 ("Neither the military 
authorities nor the courts had any clear understanding as to how they were to can)' out the 
confiscation law in its relation to the liberation of slaves."). 
170. See supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text. 
171. Some commentators have suggested that the Emancipation Proclamation was con-
sistent with the exercise of executive authority as structured in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), while others disagree. Compare FARBER, supra note 6, at 156 
("Whereas in Steel Seizure, Congress had clearly refused to authorize such seizures, no such 
history existed in Lincoln's case. Emancipation was consistent with the general trend of 
congressional action against slavery, including the Confiscation Acts."), with Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 685 (Vinson, CJ., dissenting) ("The most striking action of 
President Lincoln was the Emancipation Proclamation, issued in aid of the successful 
prosecution of the War Between the States, but wholly without statutory authority.") . 
172. See infra Parts III.B.1-3. 
173. See infra Part IIl.B. l. 
174. See infra Part IIl.B.2. 
,---
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group consisted of slaves who never escaped through Union lines dur-
ing the war, but were held by loyal masters. 175 Consequently, though 
the Emancipation Proclamation provided a blanket emancipation of 
slaves in Confederate-held areas, practically, it is three separate 
Emancipation Proclamations. The Proclamation's emancipation of 
some slaves is on very solid constitutional ground. 176 Its emancipation 
of other slaves may be on shakier constitutional ground, at least when 
the President's take care authority is viewed as the only constitutional 
support for the President's executive authority to issue the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation. 177 
1. Slaves of Disloyal Masters 
Slaves who were held by disloyal masters arguably were free as 
soon as President Lincoln issued the final Emancipation Proclama-
tion. 178 Under the Second Confiscation Act, the property of rebels 
was subject to seizure and forfeiture after the President issued a proc-
lamation warning persons in areas under rebellion to stop supporting 
the rebellion and declare allegiance to the United States. 179 The Pre-
liminary Emancipation Proclamation served as notice to persons liv-
ing in areas under rebellion. 180 The property of rebels was subject to 
seizure when the final Emancipation Proclamation was issued, as the 
Second Confiscation Act placed a duty on President Lincoln to seize 
property subject to forfeiture. 181 Section nine of the Second Confisca-
tion Act makes clear that slaves of rebels who physically came under 
United States military control were free. 182 The easiest way for the 
slaves of rebels to become emancipated was to cross Union lines. Sec-
tion eleven of the Second Confiscation Act authorized President Lin-
coln to use persons of African descent however necessary to suppress 
the rebellion. 185 Consequently, the Emancipation Proclamation notes 
175. See infra Part IIl.B.3. 
176. See infra Part IIl.B.l. 
177. See infra Parts IIl.B.2-3. 
178. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text. Practically, slaves of disloyal mas-
ters may not have been free until they crossed Union lines. 
179. See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 6. 
180. See Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 106, para. 3. Indeed, the 
slaves of disloyal masters who lived in loyal states were also subject to confiscation. See Sec-
ond Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 5. 
181. Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 6. 
182. Id.§ 9. 
183. Id. § 11. 
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that newly freed slaves would be welcomed into the armed services. 184 
Given congressional directives, the Proclamation can be deemed an 
attempt to drive slaves already subject to forfeiture toward Union lines 
as a way to add men who could help the Union suppress the rebel-
lion.185 President Lincoln would appear to have been authorized un-
der his responsibility to take care that the Second Confiscation Act be 
faithfully executed to issue the Emancipation Proclamation and apply 
it to the slaves of disloyal persons. 
2. Runaway Slaves of Loyal Masters 
President Lincoln's authority to apply the Emancipation Procla-
mation to slaves who were held by loyal masters living in the Confed-
eracy, but who escaped and ran behind Union lines, is trickier to ad-
dress. The Second Confiscation Act did not address how to treat 
slaves who ended up behind Union lines but were owned by loyalists. 
The Act suggested that under certain circumstances the slaves of loy-
alists who crossed borders and were found in non-seceding states 
could be sent back to their loyalist owners. 186 Slaves who crossed Un-
ion military lines, but were owned by loyalist owners, however, could 
not be sent back to their loyalist masters by the military, per Con-
gress's Additional Article of War187 and the Second Confiscation Act. 188 
In addition, the Second Confiscation Act allowed President Lincoln to 
use freed or fugitive slaves to suppress the rebellion. 189 The Emanci-
pation Proclamation does not appear to be required by the legislation 
passed before its issuance, but it may help resolve a problem that was 
created or exacerbated by such legislation. 
The legislation enacted before the Emancipation Proclamation 
was issued complicated a practical problem for military commanders 
in the field. Since the beginning of the war, military commanders 
184. Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 105, para. 8. 
185. See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 381-82 (noting that the Emancipation Proclama-
tion brought many slaves into Union lines, with attendant opportunities for service and 
accompanying logistical problems); see also FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 69, 71-73 (noting 
the concern at the time that the preliminary Proclamation was the equivalent of a call to 
slave insurrection) . 
186. See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 10. 
187. See Additional Article of War, supra note 85. 
188. See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 10. According to Mill.er v. U.S., 78 
U.S. 268 (1870), Congress could have subjected the property of all residents of the Con-
federacy, loyal or disloyal, to confiscation. Id. at 310-12. Whether legislation directed or 
allowed President Lincoln to do so is a different question. 
189. Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 9. 
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had to address the issue of fugitive slaves who crossed Union lines. 190 
After the Confiscation Acts were passed, some of the fugitive slaves 
were essentially free because they had been used in support of the re-
bellion or were owned by rebel masters. 191 Conversely, other slaves 
arguably were not free because their masters had remained loyal to 
the Union. 192 The commanders in the field had little or no way of 
knowing who was subject to the First Confiscation Act and who was 
not. 193 Indeed, many commanders may not have cared who was tech-
nically free and who was not given that the commanders could not re-
turn fugitive slaves to their masters as of March 1862. 194 In addition, 
under War Deparunent policy as of late 1861 and under the Second 
Confiscation Act, the fugitive slaves-free or not-could be used to 
do tasks that regular soldiers would have had to do otherwise. 195 Tak-
en together, the various enacunents suggest that commanders were 
authorized to use, and should have used, whichever people of African 
descent arrived behind Union lines or in Union encampments in 
support of the war effort. 
The Emancipation Proclamation could be read as a recognition 
that slaves of loyalists living in the Confederacy would continue to 
reach Union lines, would be put to work for the Union cause, and al-
most certainly would not be re-enslaved after the war. 196 Congress's 
arc toward emancipation makes it difficult to imagine that slaves who 
served as Union soldiers or otherwise in support of the Union cause 
would be returned to their loyalist masters after the war. 197 Indeed, 
President Lincoln's mention in the Preliminary Emancipation Proc-
190. See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 366 (noting that in the wake of General Butler's 
decision to treat runaway slaves as contraband, President Lincoln changed government 
policy so that slaves from Confederate states would not be returned, but the labor of those 
slaves would be recorded so that loyal masters might be compensated later) . 
191. See supra notes 37, 76 and accompanying text. 
192. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
193. See GERTEIS, supra note 27, at 17 (noting the inability of military officers to deter-
mine the status of slaves). 
194. See Additional Article of War, supra note 85. The contraband issue was serious. See 
MCPHERSON, supra note 139, at 298 ("Already [by the time the Emancipation Proclama-
tion was signed] 100,000 or more contrabands within Union lines in Tennessee, Louisiana, 
Virginia, and elsewhere were free by the realities of war."). 
195. See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 11 (authorizing use of slaves who 
were sufficiently fit for military seivice). 
196. See STAMPP, supra note 45, at 45 (noting that at least by 1865, President Lincoln 
believed that fugitive slaves who had performed some seivice for the Union should not be 
re-enslaved) . 
197. By 1864, slaves who served in the armed forces were freed whether they had been 
owned by loyal or disloyal owners. See supra note 88. 
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lamation of future attempts to suggest compensation for those loyal-
ists who lost property in the war could be relevant; it suggests a recog-
nition that loyalists might be compensated for slaves lost or possibly 
commandeered during the war, but that those slaves might not be re-
turned.198 Thus, the Emancipation Proclamation's grant of freedom 
to slaves of loyalists who might escape to Union lines could be viewed 
as an implied exercise of the President's duty to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed. The Proclamation may be justified as a 
preemptive way to address a problem that federal law helped create 
but did not solve: the status offugitive slaves ofloyalists behind Union 
lines who could be used for military purposes and would not be re-
turned to their loyalist owners after the war. 
This construction of the President's take care power suggests that 
a president may or must attempt to faithfully execute all of the laws, as 
best as possible. That is, when faced with a tangle of laws that creates 
a practical nightmare, the President may be allowed to choose a path 
that best addresses the practical problems that the legislation has cre-
ated or exacerbated. The power to choose the best path would be 
implied by the more general duty to take care to faithfully execute all 
of the laws. The Emancipation Proclamation's preemptive freeing of 
the slaves of both loyalists and rebels appears to go beyond the legisla-
tion Congress had passed before the Emancipation Proclamation was 
issued. However, if the Proclamation is considered an attempt to ad-
dress the practical problem of contraband fugitive slaves that com-
manders in the field had seen, and likely would continue to see, be-
cause of legislation that tilted toward encouraging fugitive slaves to 
find refuge behind Union lines and emancipating for former slaves 
who served in the U.S. armed forces, the Proclamation could be con-
sidered well within the Executive's take care authority. 199 
3. Slaves of Loyal Masters Who Never Escaped to Union Lines 
The last group of slaves ostensibly freed by the Emancipation 
Proclamation-slaves who were owned by loyalists and remained in 
Confederate-controlled areas-is the most difficult group to emanci-
pate constitutionally based solely on the President's take care authori-
198. See Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 106, para. 13. 
199. Practically, how Congress had handled the fugitive slave issue may have forced the 
emancipation issue. See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 356 ("This fugitive slave question offers 
an excellent example of the manner in which the unavoidable incidents of a war over a 
vastly extended front with a slaveholding power inevitably forced upon the Government 
the question of emancipation."). 
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ty. 200 The property of loyalists living in Confederate states had largely 
been protected under the relevant legislation. 201 In addition, the 
emancipation of the slaves who stayed in the Confederacy and were 
owned by loyalists, though a good and just idea, does not appear to 
resolve any pressing problem created or exacerbated by legislation. 202 
A reading of the President's take care authority that provides the Pres-
ident the implied power to go beyond the text of legislation to do 
what was necessary to effectuate the purposes of a statute's text might 
not cover the group of slaves at issue, as the law in place when the 
Emancipation Proclamation was issued appeared to protect the prop-
erty of loyalists living behind Confederate lines. 203 However, a reading 
of the take care authority that allows the President to execute policy 
based on a broader vision of the legislation that Congress passed on a 
general topic might allow the Emancipation Proclamation to cover 
the group of slaves at issue. 
The mass of legislation that Congress had passed regarding 
slaves, slavery, and the prosecution of the war provided President Lin-
coln with significant latitude and authority to confiscate and seize re-
bel property, emancipate slaves, use former slaves in the armed forces, 
and be aggressive in suppressing the rebellion. If the President's take 
care authority is aimed at the general arc of legislation rather than at 
particular pieces of legislation, the President's take care authority 
might cover the remaining group of slaves emancipated by the Eman-
cipation Proclamation. That would appear to be a stretch. Such a vi-
sion of the Take Care Clause might seem sensible in the context of 
emancipating slaves during the Civil War, but might not be sensible in 
other contexts. 204 
200. Under the President's commander-in-chief power, confiscating the slaves of resi-
dents of the Confederacy would have been allowed. See The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize 
Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 649-52 (1863) (holding that property of all persons residing 
within rebellious states may be treated as enemy property, regardless of personal alle-
giance, and thus is subject to capture); FARBER, supra note 6, at 138-41 (discussing the 
Prize Cases); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Emancipation Proclamation and the Commander in 
Chief Power, 40 GA. L. REV. 807, 814-16 (2006) (discussing the Prize Cases). President Lin-
coln was reluctant to confiscate the property of loyalists without compensation, but he ar-
guably had the power to do so. 
201. See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 5 (limiting confiscation to property 
of disloyal persons). 
202. See id. 
203. See id. 
204. See FARBER, supra note 6, at 141 ("A legal state of war would limit the rights of neu-
tral nations to conduct trade with the South, end the ability of noncombatant Southerners 
to invoke their normal rights as American citizens, and allow combatant Southerners to be 
treated as prisoners of war rather than criminals or traitors."). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Emancipation Proclamation is fully justified under the Pres-
ident's broad executive authority. The commander-in-chief power 
alone justifies it. The Emancipation Proclamation, however, may also 
be largely justified solely by the Take Care Clause, which requires that 
the President take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The legis-
lation Congress passed prior to the issuance of the Emancipation 
Proclamation required slaves of rebels to be emancipated, allowed fu-
gitive slaves to be used in the Union war effort, and suggested that 
slaves should be freed wherever Congress was allowed to free them. 
Against this backdrop, the Emancipation Proclamation's emancipa-
tion of all of the slaves in areas under Confederate control arguably 
follows from prior legislation. 
Functionally, the Emancipation Proclamation freed three groups 
of slaves. The first group-slaves of disloyal owners-was already sub-
ject to confiscation and emancipation under the Second Confiscation 
Act. The emancipation of those slaves can be justified even with ref-
erence to a fairly narrow take care power. The second group-slaves 
who ran to Union lines but were owned by loyal masters-was availa-
ble for military use in the Union army based on prior legislation, 
could not be returned to their slaveholders by the military, and may 
have been unlikely to have been returned to their masters after the 
war even if the Thirteenth Amendment had not been passed. Taken 
together, the relevant legislation suggested that those slaves would 
remain free, but did not explicitly command such. As importantly, 
members of the second group of slaves could not be easily distin-
guished from members of the first group of slaves. The emancipation 
of the second group of slaves could be justified by a vision of the Ex-
ecutive's take care power that allows the Executive to plot the best way 
to execute laws that, if applied strictly, would create serious problems 
for government officials charged with carrying out the congressional 
policy suggested by the legislation. The third group-slaves who did 
not run to Union lines and were owned by loyalist owners residing in 
the Confederacy-did not appear to be subject to confiscation before 
the Emancipation Proclamation was issued. The Emancipation Proc-
lamation could be authorized with respect to the third group of slaves 
if the President's take care authority is viewed broadly enough to al-
low the President to execute broad legislative policy suggested by leg-
islation, for example, Congress's pro-emancipation and anti-slavery 
Civil War policy, rather than limited to executing commands embed-
ded in particular legislative enactments. 
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The boundaries of the Take Care Clause are not clear. Conse-
quently, whether President Lincoln was authorized to issue the Eman-
cipation Proclamation based solely on the Take Care Clause is a puz-
zle subject to vigorous debate and discussion. However, given the 
ever present specter of expanding executive power generally, the puz-
zle is worthy of more time and thought than has yet been spent. 
